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Megalaw in the U.K.: Professionalism or
Corporatism? A Preliminary Report
JoHN FLOOD*
INTRODUCTION
The large law firms in America have become behemoths. Baker and
McKenzie is the largest firm in the world, scattering over 1,200 attorneys
in forty-four offices throughout the globe; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
and rom is the largest domestic firm in the United States, employing
roughly 900 lawyers.1 Others are not far behind. The only professional
organisations equivalent in size are the Big Eight accounting firms.2
Although large law firms have been in existence since the 1870s, 3 the
behemoth law firm is a comparatively recent development on Wall Street.4
These megafirms are a facet of contemporary legal systems, their devel-
opment fueled by an active and expanding economy. 5 Indeed, megafirms
now resemble their corporate clients more than other types of law firms.
Elsewhere large law firms have been noticeably absent from legal cul-
tures. In England and Wales, partnerships of any kind were prohibited
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I would like to thank Bryant Garth for his comments on an earlier draft, and also
Jonathan M. Lewis of DJ Freeman & Co. who prevented me from incuding too many
errors. I gratefully acknowledge Kunyang Norbu's patience in typing and retyping drafts of
this article. And I am grateful to Annette Fancher for her sterling work in editing and
researching.
I am indebted to both Indiana University for granting me a summer faculty fellowship
and to the Center for the Study of Law and Society, Indiana University, for research
assistance which allowed me to conduct the fieldwork for the article.
I would also like to thank the Department of Sociology at the London School of Economics
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1. The AM LAW 100: Pullout Management Report, AM. LAW., July-Aug., at 36.
2. See generally M. STEVENS, THE BiG EIGHT (1981); M. STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY:
THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRms (1987); Montagna, Accounting Rationality and Financial
Legitimation, 15 THEORY & Soc'Y 103 (1986).
3. See Hobson, Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm,
1870-1915, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN PosT-Cv WAR AMERICA 3 (G. Gawalt
ed. 1984).
4. See E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (lst
Midland Book ed. 1969).
5. Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 152 (R. Dingwall &
P. Lewis eds. 1983).
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from exceeding twenty members until the passing of the Companies Act
of 1967.6 At the turn of the century, the English equivalent of the Wall
Street firm-the City firm-possessed less than a handful of partners.
Even after World War II, English law firms were small. As Judy Slinn
writes, "[T]here were seven partners [in the law firm Freshfields], fewer
than at least two of the other leading City firms, Linklaters & Paines,
and Slaughter and May, each of whom had twelve partners. ' 7 In civil
code countries such as Italy or Germany, law firms of ten or so lawyers
still tend to be small by Anglo-American standards. 8
Marc Galanter argues that the types of lawyering performed in large
law firms are qualitatively different than ordinary lawyering. He contrasts
the differences thus:
Table 19
Contrasting Styles of Lawyering
Mega-Lawyering Ordinary Lawyering
Organisation
Size of units ......................... Larger Smaller
Specialisation ........................ More Less
Coordination ........................ More Less
Internal stratification .............. More Less
Supervision and review ........... More Less
Training inside firm ............... More Less
Span of Operation
Range of settings
(in which services are
provided) ............................. Many Few
Scope of operations ............... (Inter)national Local
6. The Companies Act of 1948 had decreed that "[n]o company, association, or
partnership consisting of more than twenty persons shall be formed for the purpose of
carrying on any business ...." Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 434. That
section of the Act was amended to eliminate the limitation with respect to solicitors in 1967.
Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, § 120(1)(a).
7. J. SLINN, A HISTORY OF FRasmmLDs 159 (1983).
8. See M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1967);
S-P. LAGUETTE, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1987); D. RUESCEEMEYER, LAWYERS
AND THEIR SocmnTY: A COMPARATIvE STUDY- OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN
THE UNITED STATES 41-42 (1973); Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: An
Explanatory Essay, 1985 A.B.F. REs. J. 5.
9. See Galanter, supra note 5, at 154.
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Site of operations .................. Multiple
Relation to Clients
Identity of client ................... (Larger)
organisations
Client control ....................... More
Frequency ............................ More continuous
Duration .............................. Longer
Range of services .................. Wider
Entry into problem ................ Earlier
Operating Style
Research .............................. More elaborate
Investigation....-..................... Painstaking
Long-term strategy ................. More often
present
Tactics ................................. More innovative
Exploration of options ........... More exhaustive
Cost .................................... Higher
Single
Individuals
(and smaller
organisations)
Less
Episodic
Shorter
Narrower
Later
Less elaborate
More perfunctory
Less often
present
More routine
More stereotyped
Lower
Corporate clients demand, and pay for, creative and thorough lawyering
because the corporate business world faces complex issues as phrt of its
normal routine. Individuals and smaller corporate clients are rarely in a
financial position to compete for such high-quality service, but rather,
must rely on less-than-thorough and more standardised lawyering.
During the last decade, primarily the years of Margaret Thatcher's three
Conservative administrations, British business, and consequently its law
firms, has undergone tremendous change. In adopting Galanter's plan of
contrasts, I will briefly sketch the forms in which English megalaw have
emerged during this period. This sketch is based on a series of interviews
I conducted with English City lawyers and documentary research performed
in 1988. I mention the year because commerce and the professions,
especially accounting and law, are in a period of rapid change, and so
this preliminary report needs to be fixed in time.' 0
10. Since this article was drafted in late 1988, the Lord Chancellor's Department has
issued a set of wide-ranging proposals, in the form of three Green Papers, that, if
implemented, will radically alter the English legal profession. Under the banner of improving
efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the Lord Chancellor is proposing the end of the functional
division between barristers and solicitors, and the introduction of contingency fee arrange-
ments. The results of the first proposal would be to allow solicitors full rights of audience
in the court system, much of which has been denied to them because of the barristers'
1989]
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This article will first outline some aspects of the so-called Thatcher
revolution and describe City law firms within the general context of the
English legal profession. The potential changes that law and the other
professions face over the next decade and how these changes compare to
the development of American professions will then be discussed. Finally,
I will indicate some of the problems in trying to explain these institutional
changes within the present theories of professions.
One complaint often heard outside the United States is that local cultures
are becoming increasingly Americanised. The thrust of this statement
usually refers to lowbrow culture such as the preponderance of American
television programs, movies, food and clothes. The Americanisation of
high culture, however, is scarce. Yet within the professions there is a
striking resemblance emerging between contemporary British professional
institutions and those in the United States that have been developing in
the twentieth century. It is possible to speculate that in the future one
could begin to talk of the Anglicisation of professions in other countries.
I will expand this point in the final section of the article.
I. THE THATCHER REVOLUTION
A year before President Ronald Reagan was elected into his first term
of office in 1980, Margaret Thatcher, as the first female Prime Minister
monopoly over appearances in the High Court. And barristers would be permitted to transact
business with clients directly, instead of using solicitors as intermediaries. The second
proposal would modify the fee-shifting rule that penalizes the loser (who pays the winner's
costs) in litigation. Lohr, British Legal Profession Faces Overhaul, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1989, § 1, at 1, col. 3. See also Forum: The Future of the Legal Profession, The Times
(London), Mar. 16, 1989, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
The Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson (the chief judge of the Court of Appeal), has
also demanded that the barristers' monopoly over appointments to the High Court bench
be ended, and that solicitors and law professors be considered eligible to sit. Gibb, Donaldson
Criticizes Bar Monopoly on High Court Judges, The Times (London), Jan. 25, 1989, § 1,
at 2, col. 2.
If these changes are introduced, and they are probable, there will be dramatic shifts in
the way legal business is conducted. As one solicitor in a medium-sized firm said:
We've already had discussions with two sets of [barristers'] chambers-at their
prompting-about the entire lot disbarring themselves and joining our firm as
our in-house advocacy department. I think it's a great idea. The idea of having
two separate groups is an intolerable restrictive practice. It's difficult explaining
to clients that their case has to be told over again to another lawyer. Litigation
is a growth area that can't be slowed down by these anachronisms.
Interview with City solicitor, in London (July 1988). (When conducting interviews, the
respondents were promised confidentiality, hence the omission of names and precise dates.)
The legacy of the philosophy of Big Bang is enduring. Now that the law business is
experiencing proposed rationalisation, the Thatcher government has turned the eye of
efficiency on the health business. Doctors and hospitals under the National Health Service
are being told they will have to face the exigencies of the open market. Sherman & Wood,
Health Service Reform the Most Sweeping in its History, The Times (London), Feb. 1,
1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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of Great Britain, was laying down her Conservative vision of the economic
and social future of the country. It was to be a radical break from the
previous years of socialism. To Mrs. Thatcher, the inception of the welfare
state following World War II was a malign boon that had sapped the-
innate strengths and creativity of the British people." They had been
insulated from the realities of economics and were no longer able to
distinguish real from imagined benefits. She believed this insulation had
wrapped itself around all strata of society.' 2 The trade unions possessed
an overweening political and economic power that had enabled them to
dominate the previous Labour government of James Callaghan and to
overstaff industry; the financial institutions of London protected them-
selves with a variety of restrictive practices which presented many obstacles
to any outsider trying to enter. Following the writings of Hayek 3 and
Freidman,14 Mrs. Thatcher introduced policies that would ineradicably
alter the national consciousness-every vestige of socialism would disap-
pear, forever.
Adopting a monetarist, supply-side view of economics, Mrs. Thatcher
reduced progressive income taxes and increased regressive taxes on expen-
ditures; spending on public welfare was scaled down dramatically. Pensions
for senior citizens were held down, benefits for the unemployed were
restricted, and one of the largest consumers of state funds-the National
Health Service-was subjected to radical surgery on its budget. Mrs.
Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph argued that the overmanning of industry
as a result of a politicised trade union movement had reduced Britain to
the status of the "Sick Man of Europe," weak and uncompetitive.' 5 The
solution, Thatcher believed, lay in industry restructuring itself. Two effects
flowed from her economic policies. First, some of the older industries,
such as shipbuilding and textiles, simply died out while others, steel for
example, were drastically reformed, bearing little resemblance to their
former selves. Second, the percentage of unemployed in the labour force
soared with no expectation that those made redundant would ever be
reemployed.16 The virtual division of Great Britain into two opposing
halves-the poor smokestack North and the prosperous, financially-based
South-has been a consequence of these effects.
11. M. HoLMs, THE FIRST THATCHER GOVERNMENT, 1979-1983: CONTEMPORARY CON-
SERVATISM AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 7-26 (1985).
12. Id. at 84-104; see also G. MAYNARD, THE ECONOMY UNDER MRS. THATCHER (1988).
13. See generally F. HAYEK, ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1973); F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
14. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); M. FRIEDMAN, TAx
LIMITATION, INFLATION AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (1978).
15. See M. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 37.
16. Id. at 89-96.
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In order to help create wealth, Mrs. Thatcher both deregulated and
reregulated Britain's financial services' providers. She abolished all ex-
change controls to ease the flow of capital in and out of British capital
markets. And in October, 1986, she ignited the "Big Bang" in the City
"of London, which swept away the artificial restrictions on the provision
of a variety of financial services. '7 There were two moves at the core of
the Big Bang: the removal of fixed commission on Stock Exchange trades
and the abolition of the distinction between jobbers (market makers) and
brokers.1 8 These moves allowed banks, domestic and overseas, to buy into
jobbing and brokering firms. Banks were thus able to offer one-stop
financial shopping for their clients. Foreign banks and support services
began to establish branches in London in increasing numbers.
Since new entities (banking-brokering-jobbing) were coming into exis-
tence, the question of how to regulate them arose. The City of London
had always prided itself on its ability to govern its own activities, 9 but
scandal among some City institutions-for example, Lloyd's insurance
market2 0-had begun to contaminate that pride, which prompted the
government to introduce the Financial Services Act of 1986.21 The Act
imposed a statutory framework of regulation on those engaged in invest-
ment business. Amongst other things, a weak version of the Securities and
Exchange Commission was established, namely, the Securities and Invest-
ments Board. 22
The City of London, though small, has been and continues to be the
center of the financial services industry in Great Britain. No other city in
the country financially competes with it. Moreover, its smallness-it meas-
ures one square mile-accentuates the importance of face-to-face interac-
tion in business transactions. Virtually all major corporations, banks
(investment and clearing), insurance companies, accounting firms, law
firms, and the various exchanges in stocks, futures, shipping and insurance
are based there. Figure 1 emphasises this element of proximity in the City
of London. As one senior partner of a large London law firm said, "The
Bank [of England] is very concerned that the key financial players be
close to each other and the Bank."' 23
17. See V. "MCCULLOUGH, ECONOMST POCKET GUmE TO THE NEw CITY 18-19 (1988).
The City of London is traditionally that area of London within a mile of the four corners
of the Bank of England.
18. P. COGGAN, THE MoNaY MACHINE 32 (1986).
19. Id. at 154-55.
20. Id.
21. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60; see generally Gower, Big Bang and City
Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1988); Note, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws
and Problems of Enforcement in Great Britain, 12 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 265 (1989).
22. V. McCuLLOuaH, supra note 17, at 102.
23. Interview with City solicitor, in London (July 1988).
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Figure 124
The City of London
The City of London also takes advantage of its midway position between
the financial centers of New York and Tokyo. Satellite communications
allow investors and securities and futures traders to be active in a number
of markets, especially where there is significant temporal overlap (as in
the case of New York and London). Figure 2 shows how London is
situated in the global market.
Figure 225
The Global Market
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The expanding securities industry created a huge demand for trained
professionals in banking, investment, accounting, law and so forth. Even
when the success of Big Bang received a slight setback on "Black Monday"
in October, 1987, when the securities markets suffered a partial collapse, 26
only some of the demand abated, and not in accounting and law.
This, then, is the context for the development of megalaw in Great
Britain. In the next section I describe the structure and work of the City
law firms.
II. THE CITY LAW FIRMS
In general terms, the English legal profession is comprised of two
branches: barristers and solicitors. 27 There are approximately 5,642 barris-
ters and 47,830 solicitors. 28 Barristers act as advocates; solicitors are
primarily office lawyers. The former are basically solo practitioners who
share office space and expenses; the latter usually form partnerships. This
crude contrast, however, hides many points of similarity and difference
between and within the two branches.
Applying Heinz and Laumann's division of the bar into the hemispheres
of corporate and individual, 29 the great majority of corporate lawyers are
solicitors based in London firms.30 The composition of a solicitors' firm
is similar to that of an American attorney's. The firm's partners own the
firm and the assistant solicitors are the functional equivalent of associates.
An additional stratum is found in the English firm: the articled clerks,
who are an advanced functional equivalent of law student clerks. 31
26. Id. at 19.
27. See generally B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE (1968); R. ABEL,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988); Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN,
LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ENGLAND (1967); Royal Commission of Legal Services, Final Report, Cmnd. 7648
(1979).
28. THE LAW SOCIETY, LONDON, A TIM FOR CHANGE, Comm. REPORT ON THE FUTURE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (THE MARRE Comm.), July 1988. Note that the figure for barristers
refers to the number of barristers, whereas the figure for solicitors refers to the number of
practising certificates. The latter excludes articled clerks and those qualified as solicitors but
not currently practising or employed in organisations where a practising certificate is not
required.
29. J. HEINz & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(1982). The division between the corporate and individual hemispheres that Heinz and
Laumann draw is exemplified by the securities lawyer in the former and the personal injury
plaintiff's lawyer in the latter.
30. For the moment I exclude the considerable number of lawyers who are employed in
the large accounting firms.
31. The only state bar in the United States to require an analogous apprenticeship (of
six months) is Vermont. See RULES OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE VT. SUP. CT., §§ 6-7
(1986).
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English legal education occurs mainly at the undergraduate degree level,
followed by a year's postgraduate vocational training either in a school
run by the Law Society, or in a polytechnic. 2 Upon successfully passing
the Law Society's examinations, the graduate must participate in a two-
year apprenticeship (articles) with a law firm before being admitted as a
qualified solicitor. Articled clerks constitute the main source of a firm's
assistant solicitors.
The population of large law firms is small in comparison to the total
number of solicitors' firms in England and Wales, but their contribution
to the economy is enormous. Table 2 shows the rank order, by numbers
of partners, of the twenty largest firms in England and Wales for 1988,
all of which are located in London.33
Table 214
The Twenty Largest Law Firms in England, Wales and Scotland
Firm Partners Assistants Articled Clerks
Clifford Chance 168 386 123
Lovell White Durrant 106 200 75
Linklaters & Paines 95 230 73
Simmons & Simmons 81 146 74
Allen & Overy 77 132 72
Herbert Smith 76 153 59
Slaughter and May 74 271 89
Freshfields 73 227 59
Norton Rose 69 137 62
Denton Hall Burgin & Warrens 60 66 27
Richards Butler 57 84 27
32. See generally R. ABEL, supra note 27. If a non-law graduate wishes to enter law,
then he or she must spend two years in postgraduate training.
33. Not all large law firms are within the confines of the City of London. A few have
offices just beyond the western limits of the City in an area known as Holborn-in the
neighborhood of the Royal Courts of Justice in Figure 1, supra text accompanying note 24.
(As midtown Manhattan is to Wall Street, so Holborn is to the City of London.) The area
adjacent to Holborn is called the West End of London, and one or two large law firms are
situated there.
Traditionally, there have been differences between the practices of City, Holborn and
West End firms. Whereas the City firms concentrated on financial work, the other firms,
partly because of their remoteness from the Bank of England and partly because of ethnic
differences, focussed more on property work. However, these distinctions are collapsing
rapidly. Among other things, high office rents are forcing law firms to consider alternative,
non-traditional sites.
34. J. PRincHARD, THE LEGAL 500: THE MAJOR LAW FiRMs IN ENGLAND WALES AND
ScoTLAND 54 (1988).
1989]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Clyde & Co 57 50 15
Nabarro Nathanson 55 67 31
McKenna & Co 54 96 28
Holman Fenwick & Willan 51 54 7
Stephenson Harwood 47 72 25
Cameron Markby 46 62 30
D J Freeman & Co 45 44 13
Penningtons Ward Bowie 41 33 20
Theodore Goddard 40 59 24
Berwin Leighton 40 45 11
The first two firms in Table 2 are the result of mergers. Some of the
remainder have grown by taking over smaller law firms, but on the whole
most firms are "grown organically" from within.3 5 Occasionally, however,
change can be forced from without, as in the case of two medium-sized
firms which were told by their major clients to merge or lose their business.
Clifford Chance, the largest British law firm, has more overseas offices
than any other firm in the world except for Baker & McKenzie.16 The
clear objective of the merger between Coward Chance and Clifford-Turner
was to produce a law firm that could compete in the international legal
markets. As one senior partner in the firm said, "In a few years time
there will only be room for about half a dozen big international law firms.
We intend to be one of them." 37
With the prospect of the European Community becoming a single market
of 320 million people in 1992, more law firms are establishing Paris and
Brussels offices. Many City firms already have overseas branch offices.
The traditional centers are Hong Kong, where English solicitors can be
easily admitted to the local bar, and the Gulf region. Within Britain itself,
however, only a few City firms have branch offices in other cities.
A. The Composition of City Law Firms
Rank ordering of the firms by numbers of partners can be misleading
because a substantial number of law firms in the City operate two-tier
partnerships: equity and salaried. Under the Partnership Act of 1890,38 an
35. The firm of Berwin Leighton had just associated with Finley, Kumble, Wagner,
Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey at the time the Finley partnership was beginning
to disintegrate. Berwin Leighton had to disassociate from it and so declare.
36. In Europe, Clifford Chance has offices in Brussels, Amsterdam, and Madrid, and
its Paris offices make it the third largest firm in France in its own right. In Asia there are
offices in Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore. It currently has the largest foreign law presence
in Tokyo of any nationality. In the Middle East the firm is represented in Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. There is also an office in New York.
37. Interview with City solicitor, in London (July 1988).
38. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 39.
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equity partner is a person who shares in the profits and is responsible for
the debts of the partnership. Salaried partners are entitled to attend
partners' meetings and examine the partnership accounts, but are not
entitled to receive a share of the profits, although they can be liable for
the partnership's debts, or to vote at the meetings. If these salaried partners
were subtracted from the totals in Table 2 above, the numbers would
shrink substantially, especially for the firms in the bottom half of the
table. For example, some firms have a ratio of 2 to 1, equity to salaried
partners. Even those firms that claim to disdain salaried partnerships are
making salaried appointments.
In part, the ambiguity surrounding salaried partners is caused by a
current shortage of assistant solicitors and articled clerks. The Recruitment
Crisis,39 a report by the Law Society, notes that the number of solicitors
holding practising certificates is rising by 1,500 to 2,000 per year. 40 This
statistic, however, must be interpreted against a decline in the number of
people under twenty-one years old.41 Thus, demand is outstripping supply
and is likely to continue. The key factor is the perceived rise in the demand
for legal services. Commercial enterprises are contributing heavily to this
trend and are expected to continue; financial services, the European
Community, pollution-all of these are creating new problems and ques-
tions that lawyers and the legal system are being asked to solve.
At present, the larger City firms operate an informal cartel that fixes
articled clerks' starting salaries. These salaries rarely vary more than a
few hundred pounds by firm. The current range is £12,500 to £13,000 to
start, rising to roughly £16,000 by the end of articles. Bids for articled
clerks are made using mostly non-monetary inducements such as the
opportunity to work in an overseas office, participation in in-house training
in negotiation or in the esoteric aspects of mergers and acquisitions work, 42
a private office, 43 and a promise of funding during postgraduate training.
Once an articled clerk is qualified, he or she is free to move to other
firms; competition for assistant solicitors among the firms is intense.
During my interviews, one comment was constantly repeated: "There aren't
enough good solicitors going around." Here the bidding over salaries
39. THE LAW SocIETY, THE RECRUITMENT CRisis, TRAWING Comm. REPORT (May 1988).
40. Id. at 2. A practising certificate is a licence to practice issued to each solicitor
annually upon payment of a fee to the Law Society.
41. Id.
42. To accomplish in-house training systematically, firms are enticing law professors out
of the universities with promises of salaries often two to three times those they could receive
in academia. And the policy has been successful. One former law professor is now a
headhunter for law firnts requiring in-house educators.
43. Most articled clerks either share offices with each other or with a solicitor in the
firm. The idea is that the articled clerk takes a participant-observer role learning by watching
and doing; it is redolent of the master-apprentice relationship in the medieval guilds.
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exists in a very attenuated form, unlike the salary wars unleashed by
Cravath, Swaine & Moore in 1986. 4 Starting salaries for an assistant are
in the region of £20,000, 41 with some firms offering up to £25,000 (i.e.,
a possible jump of £9,000 over an articled clerk's salary), rising to around
£50,000 as a junior partner.
The career track in an English law firm is essentially the same as that
in an American one. Putting aside the category of articled clerk, assistant
solicitors (associates) hope to achieve partnership status after a number
of years as a salaried employee. One difference is the greater length of
time taken to make partner in America; the period ranges over five to ten
years.4 6 And those American law firms which are introducing two-tier
partnerships effectively lengthen the track by another three to four years.
In London, demand for assistants is greater than the supply, so firms are
being compelled to offer partnerships earlier than they have done histor-
ically. 47
At present, the track has shortened to about four or five years. Many
City law firms cope with this surge in the growth of partnerships by
installing the intermediate step of salaried partner, which in Britain's
present economic climate is risky as the prospect of an equity partnership
elsewhere becomes a bargaining chip in favour of the assistant/salaried
partner. The risk is tolerated by the firm because the creation of salaried
partners offers a respite before having to commit completely to a new
partner. Some law firms control growth by operating a strict lockstep
system within the partnership that takes no account of business-getting.
Thus a new partner is given so many points according to seniority. These
points increase each year until a plateau is reached in the partner's mid-
forties. At this stage partners' incomes rise as the firm's business increases.
When partners reach their mid-fifties, their points are reduced year by
year and are given to the new partners entering the firm. In addition to
acquiring points, new partners have to contribute a portion of their draws,
44. See Adler and Baer, Headnotes, Am. LAW., June 1986, at 1. In 1986 Cravath,
Swaine and Moore in New York City offered its incoming class of associates $12,000 over
the going rate, ostensibly as a housing allowance. The real reasons were to persuade associates
to stay longer on average than they had been doing hitherto and to exterminate a stratum
of law firms that would find it difficult to compete for the most highly qualified law school
graduates. This salary war has since spilled over into other cities and down to smaller firms.
45. During the period of research for this article-the summer of 1988-the exchange
rate varied between $1.70 to $1.90 to the pound. Thus, for example, a salary of £20,000
could be the equivalent of $34,000 to $38,000.
46. Abel, Lawyers, in LAW AND THE SociAL SciENcEs 369, 395 (L. Lipson and S. Wheeler
eds. 1986).
47. Note that until the Companies Act, 1967, partnerships were not allowed to exceed
20 members. See supra note 6.
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or incomes, to fund the firm's capital. This investment is returned on
retirement, which is mandatory at most firms. 48
B. The Work of City Law Firms
Most City firms group their work into the following four broad cate-
gories: corporate and commercial, property, litigation and tax.49 The bulk
of a typical City firm's work falls into the first category of corporate and
commercial. This work includes, for example, public issues of stocks on
the Stock Exchange and on the Unlisted Securities Market, privatisations,
mergers and acquisitions, management buy-outs, venture capital financ-
ings, commercial paper issues, credit transactions in sterling and euro-
currencies, and interest rate swaps. The Big Bang of 1986 unleashed a
dramatic call for specialised legal services as the securities industry ex-
panded. For example, one type of boutique, or niche, firm traditionally
found in the City is the shipping law firm, which handles the commercial
aspects of shipping and aviation.
As the City has enjoyed the fruits of the economic boom during the
last several years, so has its property market expanded. To the east of the
City, the disused docklands are being redeveloped into a potentially
competing financial center; to the west of the City the M4 motorway has
become a high technology corridor.5 0 The property work of law firms,
including advising on the leasing, selling, and purchasing of commercial
property, and advising insurance companies and pension funds on property
development, has risen. Increased planning regulation has involved lawyers
in the earlier stages in development projects.
Litigation, the third category of City solicitors' work, covers court,
arbitration, and administrative hearings.51 The City firms keep very close
48. Not all firms subscribe to the lockstep system. There are many that believe in solely
rewarding lawyers who get business, i.e., the "eat what you kill" philosophy.
49. These categories are derived from an analysis of approximately 50 City law firm
brochures which are on file with the authbr. The marketing of law firms has become a
lucrative business in Great Britain. Law firms of all kinds are spending thousands of pounds
on the production of glossy brochures, which many lawyers admit probably have little
impact. But the game is such that no one wants to be known as the firm that does not
produce a brochure.
50. V. McCULoUGaH, supra note 17, at 26. The docklands is an area in the east of
London that has lain in desuetude for decades. Since there was no possible way the docklands
could be revivified in its original form, the government created a docklands enterprise zone.
The enterprise zone has facilitated the development of new homes, offices and an airport.
The development of Canary Wharf, for example, will result in the largest commercial project
in Europe.
The M4 is one of the major arterial highways in Great Britain. It connects London with
Wales and the southwest of England.
51. As lawyers, solicitors have a statutory monopoly on starting litigation. See Solicitors
Act, 1974, ch. 47, § 20.
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contact with the Commercial Court, a branch of the High Court staffed
by a select corps of judges who hear complex commercial cases. In
litigation, City firms confer regularly with barristers who work in elite
commercial chambers and act as advocates in the hearings. But the role
of the barrister as primus inter pares in the litigation team is declining. 2
City solicitors expect to shape the course of the litigation, and, with the
rise in the use of written briefs in English courts, solicitors compile the
first drafts to be edited by the barrister. In most matters attached to
litigation, it is the solicitor who has ultimate command.
Finally, tax tends to be the smallest department in City firms because
tax work has traditionally been carried by accounting firms.5 3 But with
the important role that tax questions play in general corporate, commercial,
and property matters, City firms are increasing their numbers of tax
lawyers and are beginning to win back some of this lucrative work from
accountants.
International work, although not placed in the above list, traditionally
has been and continues to be of increasing importance. Because of the
City's standing in international financial affairs, City firms have long been
involved in work for overseas clients. For example, the firm of Freshfields
acted for the Kuwait government in the 1960s "for the negotiation with
British Petroleum and Gulf Oil of the first major reorganisation of the
Kuwait oil concession." 54 In addition to the Middle East, City firms have
opened offices in the Far East, especially Hong Kong, where English
lawyers can be admitted to the local bar without examination. The firm
of Denton Hall Burgin & Warrens, for instance, advertises itself as an
international law firm and has translated one of its firm brochures into
Chinese. As the Middle East and Hong Kong are subject to the winds of
political change and the instability they cause, English and American law
firms are competing over what they perceive as a safe haven: the Japanese
legal market. Until recently, the Japanese bar excluded any foreign lawyer
from joining the local bar, although foreigners could "practise" as advisers
on their own varieties of domestic law. But with the rising stature of
52. Barristers have traditionally maintained the view that they are the senior branch
(collectively known as the Bar) of the profession, even though their importance vis-&-vis
solicitors has and continues to diminish. See R. ABEL, supra note 27. A number of
interviewees confirmed this perception of the declining Bar.
53. For example, the Big Eight accounting firms have large tax departments. Given the
number of lawyers they employ and recruit each year, it is reasonable to consider accountants
another branch of the legal profession. Cf. Baker, The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550,
in LAwYERS IN EARLY MODERN EuRoPE AND AMERICA (W. Prest ed. 1981) (on fifteenth
century legal professions).
On the battle over who should be the master of tax work-accountants or lawyers, see
A. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSlONS (1988); Abbott, Jurisdictional Conflicts: A New
Approach to the Development of the Legal Profession, 1986 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 187.
54. See J. SLINN, supra note 7, at 163.
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Japan as a player in the world's financial and commercial markets,
Japanese business has created a demand for foreign legal expertise, espe-
cially in the fields of mergers and acquisitions and securities. 5
The real competition in megalaw, then, will take place in the interna-
tional market between the English and American law firms. The venues
of the competition have been established-the Pacific Rim and Europe.
Which legal system, and so its lawyers, predominates will depend upon
the state of the international economy and domestic economies.
As Galanter's contrasts between megalawyering and ordinary lawyering
show 5 6 the former in both the United States and Great Britain concentrate
on advising corporate clients, not individuals, in complex and often large
business deals. This type of work requires highly developed skills wrought
in a specialist environment, such as that provided by City firms.57
III. THE FUTURE
Despite the burgeoning of megalaw in the United States, its large law
firms retain a slightly old-fashioned atmosphere. I use the qualifier
"slightly" because Fitzpatrick's analysis of the future of large law firms
in the U.S. economy in the twenty-first century, 58 demonstrates that
American lawyers can be and are on occasion radical. However, I argue
that English City lawyers are displaying a greater imaginative creativity
about the future of their profession than are their American counterparts.
However they face the future, large law firms in the United States are
subject to ties of tradition that do not affect City firms.5 9 The large
American law firm has been in existence for more than a century, and
the concept is embedded in corporate lawyers' consciousness. Corporate
law in England, however, never had the benefit of a Cravath to develop
a system for controlling and organising a law firm,60 nor was it stirred by
Langdell's ideas on educating lawyers.6' In contrast, City firms have been
55. See U.S. Law Firms Expand to Reach Global Clientele, N.Y. TnsS, May 12, 1988,
§ 1 at 1, col. 3; The Far East: High Costs, Higher Rewards, THE LAWYER, July 14, 1988,
at 14; White, Opening an Office in Tokyo, 7 THE CITY oF LONDON SOICrroRs' COMPANY
NEWSLETTER (n.s.), Dec. 1988 at 2 (on file with the author).
56. See Table 1, supra at text accompanying note 9.
57. In 1985 the estimated overseas earnings of the English legal profession was £88
million, compared to £19 million ten years earlier. Overseas Earnings of Legal Profession,
136 NEW L.J. 1018 (1986).
58. Fitzpatrick, "Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the
Century," 64 IND. L.J. 461 (1989).
59. See R. NELSON, PARTNERS wITH PoWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE
LAW FiRm (1988); R. SwoudE, THE CRAVATH Frm AND ITS PaEECESSORS 1819-1947 (1946);
E. SMaom., supra note 4.
60. See R. SwAuNE supra note 59.
61. See R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s (1983); Chase, American Legal Education Since 1885: The Case Of The Missing
Modern, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 519 (1985).
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in existence for hundreds of years and, until recently, have always been
small. It has only been during this recent period of rapid growth that City
firms have been forced to consider radical measures to overcome barriers
to growth, for example, changes in recruitment and those on generating
sufficient capital for the firm without incurring burdensome tax liabilities.
For the City of London at large, tradition is functional but not sacrosanct.
The abandonment of tradition and the radicalisation of the legal pro-
fession is encapsulated in two measures under active discussion with City
firms and their professional associations. Lawyers are adopting the prin-
ciples of incorporation and limiting liability and are considering forming
multi-disciplinary partnerships. At present the statutory framework for
permitting incorporation already exists, although the regulations have not
yet been drafted. 62 The topic causes opposing feelings among members of
the legal profession. Some senior solicitors believe that such incorporation
will have to be made under conditions of unlimited liability-to be oth-
erwise would be considered unprofessional. However, there are indirect
pressures to allow limited liability. The European Economic Community
has issued its eighth company law directive granting accounting firms the
right to incorporate with limited liability and permitting outsiders to hold
minority interests. 63 Furthermore, the City of London Law Society (the
local bar association), conducted a survey among its members in which
78% of respondents favored incorporation with limited liability.64
Multi-disciplinary or mixed partnerships is an idea consonant with the
philosophy behind the Big Bang. Producers should not be restricted from
adopting whatever organisational form is most suitable for the efficient
delivery of services. The philosophy could be given substance in a number
of ways. Law firms could admit such others as accountants and chartered
surveyors to their partnerships; lawyers could join accounting or banking
partnerships. Law firms could merge with accounting firms or banks, or
law firms in the City could merge with firms in other countries.
There is evidence that professionals are ready for organisational change.
In a survey carried out by Gouldens, a City law firm, 77% of respondents
believed mixed partnerships would form.6s Gouldens administered its ques-
tionnaire to a sample which included London and provincial (outside
London) solicitors, accountants, merchant (investment) bankers, chartered
surveyors, stockbrokers, Goulden's clients, and lawyers from the London
62. Administration of Justice Act, 1985, ch. 61 (amending Solicitors Act, 1974, ch. 47).
63. Lewis, City Comment After the Feast..., 85 L. Soc'Y's GAZETTE 9 (1988).
64. THE LAW SocITY, LONDON, StRVE OF CITY SOLICITORS, Appendix I, Table 1 (1987)
(5,000 recipients, 2,100 respondents) [hereinafter SURVEY OF CITY SOLICITORS] (on file with
author).
65. Goulden Solicitors Press Information: Mixed Partnership Survey 2 (London 1987)
(on file with author).
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Times Top 100 Companies. Accountants were in favour of mixed part-
nerships (88%), as were 43% of merchant bankers, but 45% of stock-
brokers were against mixed partnerships. 66 The Times Top 100 companies
sampled were almost evenly divided, with 31.5% in favour and 36%
against.67 In the survey conducted by the City of London Law Society,
66% of respondents-City lawyers-were in favour of mixed partnerships
and 86% wanted to allow practice with foreign lawyers. 6
As the division of labour intensifies in our postmodern society, the need
for coordination also grows. 69 Specialisation without coordination can lead
to chaos. Fitzpatrick's answer is that American lawyers will assume the
role of coordinator par excellence7O-a position American lawyers will have
to fight for against competing professions. The English solution attempts
to avoid the battles over territory or jurisdiction that will follow a group's
attempted arrogation of power by proposing instead an alliance between
former opponents. This approach displays a remarkable flexibility and
creativity in the world of professional rivalries and monopolies.
As one might expect, the picture of what might happen is blurred, but
even though no formal sanction for mixed partnerships yet exists, informal
arrangements have already been made. Law firms and banks, law firms
and accountants, law firms and sets of barristers' chambers have discussed
the potential for merging across disciplinary boundaries. Much of the
wooing and courtship has occurred: It remains only for the Law Society
to sanction the marriages.
Megalaw has taken hold in the City and is beginning to grip areas
outside London. Law firms beyond London are adopting megalaw in order
to compete with City firms. The first national law firm, now the largest
firm in Britain, was formed in 1988 and is based in Birmingham, Britain's
second largest city. A group of law firms loosely situated along the M5
motorway have come together in a confederation, with each firm retaining
its separate identity while sharing resources, such as the training of articled
clerks and access to data banks.
In July 1988, a joint committee of the Law Society and the General
Council of the Bar published a report on the state of the legal profession,
a report which attempts to determine the future configuration of the
profession. 71 The Marre Report, named after its chairwoman, is interesting
in several respects, not the least in that it attempts to revitalise and
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. SurvEY oF Crry SOLicrroRs, supra note 64, Appendix I, Table 3.
69. E. DURKHEII, THE Dmvisrox OF LABOR IN SocmTy (G. Simpson trans. 1947).
70. Fitzpatrick, supra note 58.
71. See A Tim FoR CHANGE, supra note 28. But note the Marre Committee's report
has been, to some extent, superseded by government proposals. See supra note 10.
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reaffirm the ideology of professionalism among lawyers. In a chapter
entitled "The Special Characteristics of the Legal Profession," the Report
says:
In certain respects the legal profession occupies a position which
differs from that occupied by other professions. Lawyers must always
act in their clients' best interests and must refuse to act if a conflict
of interest occurs; lawyers have a duty to the court; they are sometimes
required to represent clients in unpopular causes; they have a duty to
uphold the rule of law; for all these reasons the ordinary commercial
considerations cannot always be decisive if the traditional character
and functions of an independent legal profession are to be preserved.72
While most of the sentiments expressed by the Marre Report are laud-
able, they deny the recharged, competitive environment which now exists
in London (including some smaller financial centers in Great Britain) and
hence in the global economy. The Report emphasises the delivery of legal
services to the individual as the paradigm for the profession. 73 And despite
the strictures discussed above, law firms have already adopted creative,
commercial approaches to their survival and, unless the Report's exhor-
tations match economic realities, it will be ignored by the profession. 74
The various forms of megalaw, which are promoting the most radical
changes in the legal profession, are responses to competition from within
and without in the c6rporate hemisphere, not in the individual hemi-
sphere.7 1
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I consider it important that the content of this article be
placed in the context of the debates surrounding the sociology of profes-
sions. There has long existed the idea that professions are an important,
civilising component of society. Their members mediate on society's behalf,
72. Id. at 39 (emphasis added). Cf. J. FLOOD, BARPISTERs' C Exs: THE LAw's MMDLE-
bMN 69-76 (1983); ABA, ". . .' In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), the American Bar Association's recent attempt
to revitalise the legal profession.
73. See A Tn Fo CHANGE, supra note 28, at 45.
74. Joseph Flom, senior partner of Skadden, Arps, has responded to these precepts, in
the American context, as follows:
It is true that the large law firms are not as gentlemanly today as the practice
of law was in 1948 when I got out [of law school]. I maintain that is a very
good thing because we have to remember that gentlemanliness is often a
euphemism for the club syndrome. It is also an excuse for keeping things the
way they were and is also very often an excuse for maintaining inadequate
standards or incompetence.
Flom, The Changing Nature of the Practice of Law, FED. BAR CouNCu. BENCH AND BAR
CONF. PRoc. 94 (1984).
75. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 29.
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it is said, the realms of pure thought and applied knowledge. 76 According
to the members of the Marre Committee, the duty is greater for the legal
profession because of its multiplicity of roles and allegiances in modern
society, namely, to clients, to the courts, and to the rule of law. 77 What
does it mean when the discourse of a profession's governing body, e.g.,
the Law Society, fails to reflect that of its members, that value orientations
fragment?7 Using the theories we have at hand, can we account for and
explain the activities of these groups that claim the symbolic status of
professionalism?
The functionalist explanation of professionalism has emphasised certain
core traits as the indicia of professions: a body of theoretical knowledge,
extensive formal training, self-regulation over entry into the profession
and over discipline, and a bias towards altruism.7 9 These were the indicia
of deserved privilege. The opposing conflict explanation posits the profes-
sions as occupations engaged in a struggle to maintain professional status
and to achieve monopoly power over a segment of the marketplace.80
What, then, are we to make of the development of the large law firm in
the City of London? Is it a simple response to market demands, or is it
part of the process of rationalisation that Weber described as inevitably
accompanying the unfolding of capitalism? 81
The large London law firm is a recent innovation compared to its
American counterpart, and is consequently less bound by tradition. It
might appear contradictory to speak of law firms that have been in
existence for up to 250 years as unbound by tradition, but only if one
perceives the form of the firm to have remained constant over time. The
ferment of economic activity stirred up by the Thatcher government has
forced many economic institutions in London to abandon their former
gentlemanly ways: The notion of "my word is my bond" has been
irreparably damaged by the financial scandals that have emerged from
these economic changes.8 2 The new economic order has brought into
sharper conflict institutions that previously fought only at the margins of
their territories. 83 For example, accounting firms are so large and diver-
sified that they now compete with law firms and investment banks, not
76. See A. CARR-SAUNDERS & P. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS (1933).
77. See A TnM FOR CHANGE, supra note 28.
78. But see T. HAILIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAwYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 370 (1987).
79. Abel, supra note 46, at 370.
80. Id.; see also M. LARSON, Tm RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1977).
81. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (G.
Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
82. V. MCCUUnOUoH, supra note 17, at 59-60, 104.
83. Cf. Abbott, supra note 53, at 213.
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just for business but also for recruits. Law firms are thus stretched two
ways: On the one hand, they are beset by a strong demand for their
services; on the other, they are faced with a shortage of suitably trained
personnel. One solution to what appears to be a zero-sum game is to join
forces across disciplinary boundaries and amalgamate rather than continue
to remain separate and compete against each other and suffer.
Structurally, there are new professional formations emerging. As I
suggested earlier, the introduction of incorporation with limited liability
and multi-disciplinary partnerships will radically alter the ways in which
we depict the contours of professionalism. The problem is based in part
on the tendency of students of professions to identify each profession as
a singular entity only loosely coupled to other cognate groups. Professions,
in this light, are analogous to stepped pyramids, arranged side by side,
with the elites occupying the summits and the middle and small-firm
classes occupying the lower steps. There is, however, some overlap between
the classes. But each group (pyramid) is distinct, attempting to exercise
monopoly control over its sphere of activity. Figure 3 illustrates this
pattern with law, accounting and banking. The elites here would be the
megalaw firms, the Big Eight accounting firms and the major investment
banks.
Figure 3
A Conventional Model of Professions
elites elites
LAW ACCOUNTING BANKING
Each profession is thus characterised as a vertical or paradigmatic con-
stellation of actors producing new producers supposedly sharing the same
set of values, symbols and norms. As I have described in this article, this
model, even with recent modifications,8 4 is unduly restrictive for analytic
purposes in this period of late capitalism.
84. See A. ABBOT, supra note 53; T. HALLIDAY, supra note 78.
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Instead, I propose a different model of professions, one that is context
sensitive and takes account of the changing contours of professionalism-
a postmodern model of professionalism. Johnson has argued that the
functionalist portrayal of professions is fundamentally ahistorical, that in
order to comprehend the structure of an occupation we need the framework
of the temporal process.8 5 Following his approach, the early distinctions
between professions become apparent. Professional categories are not fixed
and impermeable enduring over time-the illusion, for example, of the
"holy trinity" of law, medicine and the church. Rather they are flexible,
even fragile, permutations dependent on economic and political structures.
For example, according to Baker, there were in the fifteenth century six
distinct elements composing the "legal profession":8 6 barristers, serjeants
and judges, clerks and officers of the central courts, apprentices, attorneys,
and solicitors and accountants. By the nineteenth century the first five of
these groups had dissolved into three-judges, barristers and solicitors-
and accountants had become a separate group, which demonstrates the
fragility of occupational structures. In addition, the fragility thesis is
underpinned by the nature of the development of the state. The modern
capitalist state itself underwent dramatic and sudden changes affecting the
growth and development of various institutions within it. Picciotto argues
that:
ETihe modern capitalist state was born within an international frame-
work. Although it was primarily national socio-economic forces that
defined its socio-geographical boundaries, its forms and functions
developed internationally. It was not until the second half of the
nineteenth century that many of the leading states taken for granted
today-notably Germany, Italy, and the United States of America-
were actually established in their modern unified forms. It was in this
same period that the main institutions of property ownership were
modernised in the major capitalist states. This process was both con-
flictual and international. It took place in a world which had been
simultaneously united and divided by several centuries of mercantile
capitalism, but where the old rigid mercantilist regulatory structures
had crumbled or were being dismantled. 87
One point to be derived from Picciotto's argument is that the growth
of capital is the engine that drives many changes, and in the last decade
or so change has been a constant element in the careers of the professions.
The globalisation of markets, especially, has had profound effects. Profes-
sions are adopting new structures and modes of working, both of which
transcend national boundaries. A result of these changes is that it has
85. T. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972).
86. See Baker, supra note 53.
87. Picciotto, The Control of Transnational Capital and the Democratisation of the
International State, 15 J.L. & Soc'Y 58, 59 (1988).
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become impossible to conceive of each profession as an independent,
unitary system. Instead of viewing them vertically or paradigmatically, we
need to consider them horizontally or syntagmatically. When multi-disci-
plinary partnerships or joint corporate ventures form, they are not merely
connections made across professional boundaries between entire profes-
sions, but rather alliances formed between particular classes in professions.
Thus, for example, a probable conglomeration would be a corporation
composed of corporate lawyers, accountants and investment bankers.
Similarly, in the small-firm classes of the professions, other kinds of
amalgamations are taking place; for example, mergers between main street
solicitors and estate agents (realtors). It makes empirical sense, then, to
depict postmodern professions as combinations of purposive groups form-
ing across disciplinary boundaries rather than within them.8 8 The final
step in the new form will occur when the production of new producers
acknowledges these changes and creates a professional who no longer
identifies with the old unitary forms. Figure 4 illustrates the possible forms
such groups might take.
Figure 4
A Postmodern Model of Professions
LAW ACCOUNTING BANKING
In Figure 4 the classes have become discrete elements in recognition of
their desire to merge across boundaries than within them. The elite stratum
here might be a conglomerate of an international law firm, a Big Eight
accounting firm, and an investment or merchant bank. In the small-firm
class, there might only be a merger between lawyers and accountants,
88. See J.F. LYDTRD, THE POSTMODamRN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984).
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since here banks are generally much larger institutions (in the U.K.). So
each class finds its own feasible theory of combination.
The transformation from a unitary profession into a complex one calls
for a new rationale to justify extending the privileges of professionalism.
If the move into a complex professional institution is made concurrently
with the move into limited liability, then the traditional defences of
professional privilege will be effectively undermined. The hallmarks of a
profession are that its human capital is placed at risk-in a partnership,
for example, one's assets are exposed and unprotected-and it gives
centrality to the fiduciary relationship. Functionalism has emphasised the
bargain entailed in giving professions power over their own domain: Self-
regulation, including freedom from publicly disclosing finanical informa-
tion, is granted by the community in exchange for the professional's
agreement not to hide behind the corporate veil.89 The professional con-
glomerate-composed of several different occupations, each with different
normative perspectives-with its limited risk exposure and global base, is
a vastly different creature than that described and prescribed by the
functionalist paradigm. If the legal profession, in conjunction with others,
changes in the directions described, will it be able to justify its independ-
ence from state regulation?9" With professions regulating themselves, the
state acts as guarantor for their monopolies. In the domain of corporate
enterprises, the state generally acts as regulator-e.g., antitrust and up-
holding warranties-rather than sanctioning monopoly power. As the
corporate professions become more similar to their client organisations,
the state may shift its role from guarantor to regulator. In the United
States, for example, incursions into the monopoly of the legal profession's
power to regulate itself have already occurred. The Internal Revenue
Service and the Securities and Exchange Commission impose requirements
on and punish infringements by those who practise within their bailiwicks. 91
Professional boundaries are blurring and collapsing and new ones are
rising; work practices are changing; 92 the state is being compelled to
89. Parsons, Professions, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
536, 541 (1968); R. ABEL supra note 27, at 29.
90. In the area of investment business the legal profession is already indirectly regulated
by the state. Under the Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, the Securities and Investment
Board has granted the Law Society the power, as a Recognized Professional Body, to
regulate solicitors to undertake investment business which is incidental to the carrying on
of the profession. Firms have to advertise this fact. Lovell White Durrant, for example, has
at the bottom of its notepaper, "The firm is regulated in the conduct of its investment
business by the Law Society."
91. Routh, Liabilities of a Tax Preparer: An Overview, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 479 (1984);
Wilczek, Rulings Tend to Confuse Duties, Responsibilities of Corporate Attorneys, in SEC
'82 VoLUmE X (H. Schlagman & N. Hirsch eds. 1982).
92. In the field of law practice, see E. SPANOLER, LAWYERS FOR Hn: SALARIED
PROFESSIONALS AT WoRKc (1986); Cf. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law"
Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEw HIGH PRIEST:
LAWYERS IN PosT-Crvm WAR AMERICA 51 (G. Gawalt ed. 1984).
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reappraise its relationship with these groups. Megalaw is part of this
bundle of changes taking place in the division of labour, and it forces us
to change our conceptions of ideal types of professions. In order to
account for the emergence of occupational types such as megalaw, we can
no longer rely on the traditional, discrete categories-law, accounting and
banking-within single cultures. Comparative analyses across occupations
and cultures are necessary in order to understand the elements of the work
undertaken by these emerging formations. 93
93. But see T. JoHNsoN, supra note 85; Brante, Sociological Approaches to the Profes-
sions, 31 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 119 (1988); Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L.J.
423 (1989).
